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From Nuclear to Human Security? Prerequisites and 
Motives for the German Chernobyl Commitment 
in Belarus 
Melanie Arndt  
Abstract: »Von nuklearer Sicherheit zu Human Security? Voraussetzungen 
und Motive des deutschen Tschernobylengagements in Belarus«. This paper 
analyses the involvement of West German initiatives in Belarus following the 
Chernobyl disaster, with special regard to the social construction of human se-
curity. It focuses on the prerequisites for this involvement and the New Social 
Movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, in particular the “new” peace and anti-
nuclear power movement. Based on the change in the emotional regime in 
West Germany, where fear was increasingly being openly expressed, civil so-
ciety groups committed themselves to mitigating the consequences of the dis-
aster. The paper explores perceptions and the criteria of security/certainty and, 
more specifically, the criteria of insecurity/uncertainty by which those actors 
were governed in their involvement. 
Keywords: security, Chernobyl, civil society, fear, commitment, atom, nuclear 
energy, New Social Movements. 
 
“We need another profound transition in thinking – from nuclear to human 
security”, postulated the United Nation’s Human Development Report in 
1994.1 Thus it marked the new challenges and perceptions which followed the 
clear-cut division of the world during the Cold War era. Even if we are far 
away from guaranteeing either nuclear or human security, the latter phase of 
the Cold War marked a crucial shift in the perception of security not only in the 
political realm, but also in civil society. The understanding of security moved 
away from a concept which was mainly military and directed at nation states to 
a concept which focuses on individual security and the “freedom from fear and 
want”2 as “legitimate concerns of ordinary people (…) in their daily lives”, as 
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Melanie Arndt, Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung 
Potsdam, Am Neuen Markt 1, 14467 Potsdam, Germany; e-mail: arndt@zzf-pdm.de. 
This paper is based on a presentation given at the conference “The Production of Human 
Security in Premodern and Contemporary History” in Bochum, 10.4.2010, and Arndt 2010. 
I am very thankful for all the helpful comments given during the conference and the critical 
eyes of all the reviewers; special thanks to Rüdiger Graf and Cornel Zwierlein. 
1  United Nations Development Programme 1994, 22. 
2  “Freedom from fear and want” were already key aspects in Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s 
Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of the United Nations. Later on they were turned into major components of human 
security. United Nations Development Programme 1994, 24. 
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the Human Development Report states.3 These concerns became especially 
virulent and influential after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 which became a 
metaphor for many of the challenging processes taking place at the end of the 
Cold War.  
As early as the 10th anniversary of the disaster, the oft-cited Belarusian 
writer Svetlana Aleksievich declared that Chernobyl had already become “a 
metaphor, a symbol”.4 The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident has indeed be-
come a manifold metaphor for many issues – whether directly related to the 
disaster or not. At the heart of these issues lies a deep uncertainty, undermining 
belief in technological progress, our ability to control risky technologies, and 
the relative security of everyday life. The “symbolic fallout”5 of the Chernobyl 
disaster, as anthropologist Sarah Phillips put it, comprises, among other things: 
“anthropological shock” (Beck), the nuclear age, industrial and environmental 
disasters, the end of the Soviet Union, radioactive contamination, incompre-
hensible (in the most literal sense) afflictions, new forms of adventure tourism, 
ambiguity, fear, disability, and disease. 
However, Chernobyl has been more than a “semantic catastrophe”, as a 
German nuclear physicist succinctly surmised.6 The disaster not only disclosed 
the limits of technical progress, but also the limits of the state’s power to pro-
tect its own citizens. As a “focusing event”7 Chernobyl changed prior concep-
tions of science, technology, security, and citizenship. The disaster8 accelerated 
the breakdown of state socialism9, which claimed to have taken on a wide 
range of social provision, which had previously been provided by families. 
However, Chernobyl did more than just question the authority of scientific 
expertise and the Cold War rhetoric of technological progress in socialist sys-
tems. This “politicization of knowing” also produced many laypersons, such as 
worried parents, and also experts who began to perceive themselves as citizens 
and as citizens with concerns about the environment: what the anthropologist 
Krista M. Harper called a “politicization of caring”.10 
While the discussion about the dangers of nuclear energy in the Federal Re-
public of Germany had started long before the incident in the Ukrainian nuclear 
power plant, on the 26th of April 1986, the hitherto only hypothetical case of 
                                                             
3  United Nations Development Programme 1994, 22. 
4  Aleksievich 1998, 25. In the paper I use scientific transliteration from the Russian and 
Belarusian languages – with the exception of commonly used terms, such as “Chernobyl”. 
5  Phillips 2008, 159. 
6  Quoted in Lenk 1996, 363. 
7  Birkland 1996. 
8  Disaster is here to be understood in the sense of the sociologically dominated Disaster 
Studies as process and not merely event.  
9  Here I doubt the assertion of Herfried Münkler that the breakdown of the socialist regimes 
was a consequence of maximized security and the corresponding perceptions of the popula-
tion. Münkler 2010.  
10  Harper 2001, 114. 
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the “maximum credible accident” actually occurred, the conciliatory “remain-
ing risk” became an everyday danger and existential threat. Thinking in terms 
of categories of positive security was displaced by a negative understanding of 
security – the general certainty that the consequences of the disaster will last, 
and the radiation released will cause health threats and limits on quality of life 
without the possibility of having concrete certainty about these consequences in 
the near, as well as distant, future. This all-embracing uncertainty expressed 
itself not least in experiences of paralysis and fear.11 
At the same time, Chernobyl marked a clearly perceptible turning point in 
the transnational commitment of civil society. Though it did not immediately 
follow the catastrophe, step by step, perestroika opened up methods and forms 
of involvement which had not existed in Cold War thinking, but which were at 
the same time an expression and result of those processes which had occurred 
since the 1970s in the environmental and peace movements. Alongside all the 
lugubrious metaphors, “Chernobyl” has therefore also become a symbol of a 
movement of solidarity reaching beyond Europe’s borders, a symbol of civil 
society involvement consisting of innumerable smaller and larger groups. Be-
sides the US, Italy and Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany provided the 
largest part of private help for the afflicted of Belarus.12 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, more than 1,000 larger and especially 
smaller organisations have been established in Germany, which are concerned 
with helping the victims of the Chernobyl disaster. They invited hundreds of 
thousands of children from radioactively contaminated areas to recuperate 
and/or get medical attention for some weeks or months in “safe” and “clean” 
environments. Even if the number of children invited has been declining, 
around 10,000 Belarusian children still spend their holidays in Germany every 
year.13 At the same time that the recuperation of children was taking place 
abroad, recreational centres in “clean” Belarusian areas arose, for example 
“Nadezhda” (Hope), which is directed by the German-Belarusian organisation 
of the same name. Additionally, the initiatives brought countless trailer-loads 
of donations – clothes, medicine, medical and technical equipment, toys and 
the like – to the most affected countries. Together with the recuperation of 
children, this has represented only the most visible part of the intensive coop-
eration between German and Belarusian civil-society organisations. Addition-
                                                             
11  I prefer the use of “fear” and “anxiety” instead of the highly connotated term of “angst”. 
Furthermore, I share Joanna Bourke’s scepticism about the usefulness of the dominant dis-
tinction between “fear” (as referring to an immediate, objective threat) and “anxiety” (as 
referring to an anticipated, subjective threat) in historical research and thus will use the 
terms synonymously. Bourke argues: “The distinction between fear and anxiety too often 
rests on a distinction between the rational and the irrational. However, there is no strict di-
vision between reason and emotion.” Cf. Bourke 2003, 126. 
12  Sahm 2006, 108. 
13  Ibid. 
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ally, training courses were organised for Belarusian farmers, nurses and doc-
tors. German citizens’ groups used German money to build entirely new set-
tlements using alternative energy concepts for evacuees and resettlers from 
radioactively contaminated areas in Belarus. 
At the centre of this paper is the involvement of German14 Chernobyl initia-
tives in Belarus, which will be analysed with special regard to the social con-
struction of (human) security. In particular, the prerequisites for this involve-
ment – which are to be found in the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 
the 1970s and especially in the peace and anti-nuclear movement – shall be 
presented and historicised. A central issue is the question: by which perceptions 
and criteria of security/certainty and particularly insecurity/uncertainty were 
actors governed in their involvement? How did they apply the concept of hu-
man security to their actions without even referring to it by name? The paper 
starts with a short sketch of the ambiguous nuclear euphoria of the 1950s. The 
following section will be a brief outline of the anti-nuclear power plant move-
ment (anti-NPP movement) and the “new” peace movement, to which the ma-
jority of the initiatives and actors attached themselves. The outline thereby 
emphasises the changing perceptions of fear and security as an impetus for civil 
societal involvement in the late Cold War phase. After a short survey of the 
scale and consequences of the incident at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant, 
finally, the German commitment, its supporters, and the motives involved will 
be examined. 
I assume a very broad understanding of security as a (basic) need and emo-
tion15, which will be unlocked by a broad semantic field of complementary 
counter- and extension terms (such as certainty, insecurity, uncertainty16, threat, 
risk, and danger). Fear as a consequence and, at the same time, expression of 
insecurity and uncertainty takes on a special position, because it can be neither 
regulated nor suppressed on the level of society. In the all-embracing situation 
of uncertainty and insecurity, fears not only become increasingly verbalized, 
but at the same time also an important engine for political involvement and 
civil society mobilization. Fear will be understood not as an anthropological 
                                                             
14  This paper concentrates on West German initiatives, but their East German counterparts are 
also part of the larger research project. 
15  Febvre 1990, 116. 
16  As Bauman correctly stated, the German concept of “Sicherheit” is “considerably more 
inclusive” than the English word “security”. It encompasses – at the very least – all the di-
mensions of “security”, “certainty” and “safety”. Since the “effects of weakened security, 
certainty and safety are remarkably similar” with “symptoms being virtually indistinguish-
able”, as Bauman also noted, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between these 
three dimensions and most authors actually tend to use them simultaneously. Nevertheless, 
I try to distinguish between these various dimensions (and their respective negations) by 
applying “certainty” in reference to positive assurance and confidence in a certain outcome 
and “security” in reference to policy-related issues, and the physical realm. “Safety” will be 
used in technical terms only. Cf. Bauman 1999, 17-18. 
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constant, but rather as a phenomenon becoming manifest and thus measurable 
in different historical and social constellations by its public expression.17  
From Atomic Age to Atomic Angst?  
As infernal as the metaphors for the Chernobyl disaster turned out to be, just as 
many hopeful pictures were connected to the causa efficiens, the “atom”18, 
against the background of devastating World War II experiences and the front-
lines of the Cold War in the 1950s.19 From today’s point of view, these ex-
tended well into the realm of fantasy and were tied to the enthusiasm for radio-
activity of the 1920s. The peaceful use of nuclear power was promoted as an 
“integration ideology” in the 1950s.20 If nuclear power had served only for 
electricity production, the “myth of the ‘atomic age’” would never have 
arisen.21 It was precisely these utopian metaphors which fuelled the enthusiasm 
for radioactivity. At the same time they seemed to be a useful means of rela-
tivising the horrible memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and turning people’s 
attention to a literally – and, at this time, still positively – radiant future.22 
Apart from some electricity producers, scientists, politicians and writers 
were also captivated by the all-embracing use of the atom in biology, medicine, 
agriculture, and even tourism. The capabilities of nuclear physics seemed to be 
almost unlimited: from the revolution in the chemical industry through radio-
chemistry via desalination of seawater and desert irrigation, culminating in the 
development of the Arctic. Small nuclear power reactors were planned for use 
not only in ships and submarines, but also in aeroplanes, trains, cars and air 
conditioners.23 Thus, such prospects were not limited to hotheads and it was not 
just a shallow, media-fuelled phenomenon without further repercussions, as 
Radkau proved.24 While in Germany the population at large, affected by the 
Hiroshima pictures, remained rather sceptical and fearful, there were many 
                                                             
17  Cf. Zill 2007; Greiner 2009, 18.  
18  The oversimplifying term “atom” corresponds with the use in the period described and 
stands synonymously for the whole complex of its capabilities. For a discussion of the 
changing usage of the term see Jung 1994. 
19  Cf. for the importance of the World War II and Cold War experiences in this development: 
Nehring 2004. 
20  Rusinek 1993, 14; Radkau 1983, 78. 
21  Radkau 1983, 78. 
22  Cf. for the French case: Hecht 1998.  
23  Cf. Rusinek 1993, 14; Radkau 1983, 79-100; Engels 2006, 344-346; Tiggemann 2004, 54-
57; Müller 1990, 3-12. Recently Microsoft founder Bill Gates attracted attention with his 
plans for the resumption of mini-reactors. Cf. “Bill Gates will mit Mini-Meilern die Kern-
kraft revolutionieren”, Spiegel online, 23.3.2010. 
24  Radkau 1983, 87. 
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supporters, in particular amongst the intellectuals. In the course of this eupho-
ria, alternatives to the use of nuclear power fell prey to repression.25 
The political reality in the “long 1950s”26 regarding nuclear power was any-
thing but free of fear: the threatening and aggressive competition between the 
nuclear states involving ever more precarious bomb tests induced a change in 
the assessment of nuclear energy in the hitherto passive West German popula-
tion in 1956.27 The Atomic Ministry even spoke of a “psychosis of radiation 
fear (…) here and there”.28 Even if the diagnosis was exaggerated, people did 
indeed begin to articulate anxieties, which also opposed peaceful uses and 
which started to penetrate into everyday conversation. In the light of the emerg-
ing knowledge of the devastating consequences of American nuclear weapons 
tests at the Bikini atoll for uninvolved Japanese fishermen, fear of radioactive 
fallout became a topic beyond the “hot” war for the first time. According a 
survey in 1959, only a small proportion of the West German population (eight 
percent) supported the unrestrained use of nuclear power. 17 percent suspected 
that the development of its civil use would one day lead to atomic war.29  
In the 1950s, instead of an undamped euphoria, there was rather atomic 
euphoria accompanied by a simultaneous public insight into the dangers con-
nected with nuclear weapons.30 Worries about damage to health by released 
radionuclides were increasingly expressed – worries that could already have 
emerged after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but which only took shape ten years 
after. This perceived insecurity found its first institutionalized expression in the 
Pugwash conferences against nuclear weapon tests and the Göttingen Mani-
festo, where 18 German nuclear scientists warned about the “life-destructing 
effects” of nuclear weapons, against which there is no protection at all.31 While 
in 1968 the majority of the West German population still predominantly asso-
ciated “atom” with the bomb and only in exceptional cases with nuclear power 
plants32, in the course of the 1970s the topic became strongly symbolically 
loaded and increasingly encompassed the civil use of nuclear energy. Conse-
quently, the nuclear discourse took a central place in the emerging environ-
mental debates at a time when “security” became one of the key notions in the 
domestic political discourse.33 
                                                             
25  Radkau 1983, 78-89. 
26  Abelshauser 1987. 
27  On the change of the emotional regime in postwar West Germany see also: Biess 2009, 
215-243. 
28  Radkau 1983, 98.  
29  Ibid. 
30  Radkau 1983, 92. Cf. for a comparison with Great Britain: Nehring 2004. 
31  Göttinger Manifest 1957. 
32  Cf. Radkau 1983, 435. 
33  Cf. Weisker 2005, 211; Nehring 2004, 154.  
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The development of the anti-nuclear power movement, one of the largest 
protest movements in the history of West Germany, had passed through four 
phases by the end of the 1970s.34 The early phase started with the building of 
the first research reactors in Karlsruhe and Jülich in 1957. This phase lasted 
until the end of the 1960s and was limited to the locality. It carried its protest 
out through official channels. Mayors and city or municipal councillors were 
the leading figures. Initially, they concentrated less on the specific dangers of 
radioactivity, and more on general transformations of the landscape and the 
local economic structure. With the opposition against the nuclear power plant 
in Würgassen at the end of the 1960s, the protest movement expanded beyond 
the regional level for the first time and referred increasingly directly to nuclear 
power. The threshold to extra-legal methods had not yet been passed in Wür-
gassen. Only with the anti-nuclear power protest in Wyhl in 1975 did the 
movement transform into a mass movement and develop elements of campaign 
protest, which today belong to the standard repertoire.35 Wyhl became a “sym-
bolic term”36 for the anti-NPP resistance movement. However, even here the 
motives for the protests initially did not directly correlate with the planned 
nuclear power plant, but were aimed above all against the creation of a “Ruhr 
region on the Upper Rhine”, which was associated with foreign infiltration, 
destruction of the agricultural landscape, and deterioration of the Kaiserstuhl 
wines by the wafts of mist produced by the plant’s cooling towers. 
In Wyhl the local resistance for the first time formed a series of influential 
alliances – with the political Left, the sciences (above all Freiburg University) 
and the so-called “atomic tourists”. Thus, it succeeded in attracting attention on 
a supra-regional level and in formulating new lines of argument against nuclear 
energy. Additionally, the movement increasingly addressed the problem of 
hazardous incidents – something which reactor safety experts had done long 
before, but which had not entered the public sphere. The escalation phase of the 
protests in 1976 and 1977 was particularly defined by violence. With the estab-
lishment of the Gorleben “nuclear disposal park”, the protest focused on the 
unsolved problem of atomic waste.37 During this phase, the nuclear power 
controversy developed into a central socio-political issue. Numerous publica-
tions appeared, more and more voices could be heard and fuelled a broad dis-
course of fear and individual concerns. A mere month before the reactor explo-
sion in Chernobyl the anti-NPP movement experienced yet another climax in 
Wackersdorf on the Easter weekend of 1986.38 
                                                             
34  The following according to Radkau 1983, 434-455. 
35  For details see, for example, Engels 2006, 346-376; Engels 2003, 103-130; Engels 2002, 
407-424.  
36  Weisker 2005, 210.  
37  For details concerning Gorleben and the disposal problems see: Tiggemann 2004.  
38  Cf. Kretschmer and Rucht 1987, 134-163.  
 296
The anti-NPP movement was formed in the context, which Frank Biess de-
scribed as the “incubation time of a new subject culture” in the 1960s and 
1970s, where a “new subjectivity defined by fear” and an increasingly “ubiqui-
tous fear” spread.39 Thereby the “fearful self” of the 1970s reacted to the in-
creasing number of real dangers in the age of economic recession, ecological 
degradation, and terrorism. At the same time, the “new subjectivity” only cre-
ated those patterns of perception by which the meanings of these dangers could 
be made accessible for individuals. Central to this was the articulation of per-
sonal concern and emotionality in as authentic a manner as possible which – in 
contrast to the emotionally silent traditional culture – gave fear a tongue. Thus, 
the key concerns of the human security concept, individual “human life and 
dignity”40, came to the fore. Personal emotional concern and perceived insecu-
rity could thereby become the trigger for political and societal involvement – 
also, and in particular, through anxiety.41 To be sure, this does not mean that 
every single West German citizen felt fear in the 1970s. As Biess showed, fear 
was rather just one dimension in the “subjective balance of emotions”, namely 
at the normative level of subject culture as well as at the level of everyday 
emotional practices. Precisely this increasing acceptance and ability to verbal-
ize emotional concern were essential preconditions for the involvement with 
Chernobyl. 
Fear and the perception of insecurity were also central benchmarks of the 
“new” peace movement. They appeared almost as a direct response to the 
atomic (war) danger.42 The movement bundled a multitude of fears and funda-
mental threats: the fear of a third world war, the threat of environmental dete-
rioration as well as fear of technology and the uncontrollable consequences of 
its use. The campaigners moved beyond pure protest and demanded an alterna-
tive way of life, which should possess more solidarity, be more peaceful, and 
be more ecologically appropriate. In this way the peace movement partially 
overlapped with the environmental or anti-NPP movement, a development 
which found its expression in their self-identification as the “Ökopax”43 move-
ment. The “new” peace movement was – in opposition to the so-called “first” 
peace movement of the 1960s – ideologically heterogeneous; however, its 
protagonists mainly had Christian, pacifist, left-wing or alternative back-
grounds. Because their principles were the far-reaching renunciation of force 
and the focus on symbolic actions, they gained credibility and reputation well 
                                                             
39  Cf. Biess 2008, 52. 
40  United Nations Development Programme 1994, 22. 
41  Cf. United Nations Development Programme 1994, 23. 
42  Cf. Schregel 2009, 508; more in detail on the peace movement: Wasmuth 1987, 109-133. 
43  “Öko” is an abbreviation of “Ökologie” (German: ecology), and “pax” (Latin) stands for 
“peace”. 
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into the conservative camp and could rest on a “thick cushion of sympathy” in 
almost all sectors of the population.44 
An important prerequisite for the later involvement in Chernobyl was not 
only the increase in “atomic fear”, but also the decrease in “fear of the Rus-
sians”. As a basis for legitimizing the Western armament effort and also partly 
because of the discussion of alternative – and in many cases this also meant 
communist – concepts of life, its credibility in terms of national security be-
came increasingly eroded and thus, little by little, tended to be excluded from 
the “repertoire of legitimate emotional expressions”.45 
Particularly within the Ökopax movement, fear “as a politicized and politi-
cally accepted emotional condition” merely described an intermediate stage on 
the way to action. As a semantic counterpart of fear, campaigners did not elect 
the direct negation (“no fear”), but rather made use of allegorical antonyms 
such as “bravery” and “hope”, making involvement appear almost compul-
sory.46 
The Occurrence of the “Remaining Risk”: 
the Chernobyl Disaster 
Even today not all technical, physical, biological, medical, and psychological 
consequences of the reactor explosion of the 26th of April 1986 are disclosed 
in detail; only conflicting and imprecise representations are available.47 What is 
certain is that a planned test triggered the explosion, radioactively contaminat-
ing large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, but also parts of the rest of 
Europe and far beyond its borders. Today’s Belarus which, in the public and 
scientific perception of Chernobyl, is still in Ukraine’s shadow, received ap-
proximately 70 percent of the total radioactive fallout. 23 percent of the Bela-
rusian territory was contaminated with more than one Curie Caesium-137 per 
square kilometre.48 
                                                             
44  Brand et al. 1986, 263. 
45  Schregel 2009, 518. 
46  Schregel 2009, 515-518. 
47  As introduction see the special issue of the journal OSTEUROPA on the occasion of the 
20th anniversary of the disaster or the short introduction by Brüggemeier 2006; Brügge-
meier 1998, 7, 33.  
48  Caesium-137 with a radioactive half-life of thirty years was the most widely distributed 
long-lived radioactive element after the incident. Maps and descriptions therefore usually 
refer to it, although it is only one among approximately 40 other radionuclides. The con-
tamination per square kilometer is given either in the former unit, Curie (Ci), or in Bec-
querel (Bq). Both units indicate how much radiation is measured by Geiger counters in 
these areas. One Bq is equivalent to one nucleus decay per second. The value “over 1 
Ci/km2 caesium-137” does not in itself indicate how much radiation is absorbed by the peo-
ple living in these areas. As experts estimate, people living in an area contaminated with 1 
to 5 Ci/km2 absorb an average of less than 1.0 millisieverts (mSV) per year. mSv and 
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Shortly after receiving the first announcements from Scandinavia, rumours 
also circulated in Germany about a Soviet nuclear incident with devastating 
consequences. While the federal government urged calm, the federal states 
assessed the dangers very differently, partly issuing panic recommendations. 
Open-air pools and swimming lakes were to be avoided, children were not to 
play outdoors, outdoor shoes were to be left at the front door, and also adults 
were not to expose themselves to rain without protection. With every new 
directive, insecurity, uncertainty, and disorientation increased. In addition to 
the difficulties of measuring radioactivity and its impact on human beings, 
radioactive pollution is highly variable and thus complicates risk assessment. 
Locally it can vary strongly even within a single settlement. It is out of ques-
tion that life could continue in “the normal way” in the most affected regions, 
as the Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashėnka never tires of stressing.49 In 
Belarus, it is not only the case that settlement patterns have been changed by 
evacuation, relocation, and resettlement since Chernobyl – it is also perceptions 
of landscapes, nutritional practices, and cultural practices which have altered. 
Even more difficult to judge than the radioecological impacts are long-term 
medical consequences. Indeed, cancer – and here particularly the previously 
very rare forms of childhood thyroid cancer – as well as respiratory, eye, blood, 
heart and gastrointestinal diseases, diabetes, immune defects (“Chernobyl 
Aids”) and various forms of dystonia (a neurological movement disorder) and 
encephalopathy (a collective term for different brain disorders) increased con-
siderably following the disaster. However, to draw a direct connection to the 
catastrophe is often problematic, because there are several other factors which 
might have triggered the disease. Furthermore, every human organism reacts 
differently to radiation. Expert statements concerning the additional cancer 
deaths resulting from the emanated radioactivity fluctuate between several 
hundreds and hundreds of thousands because of the different methodical ap-
proaches.50 These imprecise indications, together with the use of consistently 
differing numbers and references, form the sounding board of manifold uncer-
tainties, fears, and also panic. 
                                                                                                                                
Sieverts (Sv) are the internationally recognized units used to measure the harmful effects of 
radiation on the human body (biologically effective dose). According to most sources, only 
when soil contamination is over 5 Ci/km2 are people likely to absorb more than 1 to 5 mSv 
per year. As a comparison: within the European Union, 1 mSv per year is the dose limit for 
people living near a nuclear power station. Cf. Internationale Kommunikationsplattform zu 
den Langzeit-Folgen des Tschernobyl Unglücks. <www.chernobyl.info.> (accessed August 
5, 2010). 
49  Lukashėnka 2006. Cf. also Arndt 2006. 
50  Cf. Sahm 1999, 191-192. 
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From the Expression of Fear to Involvement 
“Fear always demands a counterdraft (Gegenentwurf)”, Bernd Greiner points 
out, because in the long run it is bearable neither for individuals nor for collec-
tives.51 While individuals can sustain psychological damage, societies can meet 
the limits of political integration and cohesion if the state fails to fulfil its own 
unique task, namely to provide security and freedom from want, fear, and un-
certainty.52 The involvement of German civil society initiatives in the mitiga-
tion of the consequences of Chernobyl in Belarus can be seen as one possible 
countercurrent. Thus, from the very beginning, German uncertainty stood in a 
mutual relationship with the fear on the Belarusian side. The emotional concern 
was linked to a moral commitment to getting involved. Here one ought to con-
sider that benevolence as “individual pro-social action” contains an accentuated 
subjective component. It aims at helping people who, in the eyes of the bene-
factor, appear to be needy. Thus, the changeable horizon of values of those 
involved is critical.53  
Instead of speaking of a dichotomy between pro-social motives of action 
such as solidarity, helping or orientation towards common welfare on the one 
hand, and concern about individual welfare, improving one’s self-esteem or 
self-realisation on the other hand, it is much more appropriate to look at be-
nevolence not as a burden, but as a “potential gain” for the initiatives. Thus, 
pro-social behaviour and self-interest are not mutually exclusive.54 
Because of diffusion via the mass media, the West was better informed 
about the possible consequences and dimensions of the incident, which also led 
much more quickly to a perception of insecurity amongst large parts of the 
population than in Soviet Belarus.55 There, the fear of those not directly af-
fected took shape only bit by bit, as the statement by Henadz’ Hrushavys, the 
head of the Belarusian organisation “For the children of Chernobyl” confirms: 
Fear did not come immediately. It did not go with the peaceful atom in our 
consciousness. Our world view looked like this: the martial atom is a baleful 
mushroom in the sky such as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, people who burn in-
to ashes in one second; the peaceful atom in contrast was as harmless as a 
light bulb.56  
If, in the very beginning, the involvement in Chernobyl was not a reaction to 
a “call for help” from Belarus, an explanation is needed for what it was, in fact, 
a reaction to. In the involvement with Chernobyl, one also finds such “positive 
                                                             
51  Greiner 2009, 21. 
52  Greiner 2009. 
53  Cf. Lingelbach 2009, 14.  
54  Lingelbach 2009, 20. 
55  For the perceived threat after Chernobyl in Western European countries see the survey 
based study of Tønnessen et al. 2002. 
56  Gruschewoi 2006, 7. 
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psychological gratification” as significant individual psychological motives, 
which Lingelbach elaborated for the West German market for charitable dona-
tions:57 commitment to others – be it by charitable donation or the temporary 
accommodation of a “Chernobyl child” – allows the acting out of paternalisti-
cally motivated feelings of pre-eminence. It is accompanied by the affirmation 
that one does not belong to those who are in need of help. Involvement can turn 
into an effective tool for coping with fears, if those involved put themselves 
empathically in the place of those in need and thus identify with the uncertainty 
and anxiety of the others (or at least their own perceptions of it). In turn, via 
this involvement, feelings of insecurity can be reduced. 
“Reconciliation with rolled-up sleeves” is what the journalist Johannes 
Voswinkel called the German involvement in Chernobyl.58 The inception of the 
involvement stood in close connection with the partial opening of the Soviet 
Union in the course of perestroika and the coming to terms with the crimes 
committed by Germans on Soviet territory under National Socialism. Official 
Soviet statistics number the deaths at more than 2.2 millions in Belarus alone.59 
The Germans razed to the ground more than 209 Belarusian towns and 9,200 
villages/settlements.60 In 1988 and 1989, the first Protestant pilgrimages into 
the still-existing BSSR took place to ask for “peace and reconciliation”.61 A 
large part of the German Chernobyl involvement originated in the Christian 
reconciliation work.62 By this route, the first links to the hitherto unknown 
country were made, where the memories of the atrocities of WWII are top 
issues even today and often mentioned in the same breath as the memory of 
Chernobyl. The vanguard of the Chernobyl initiatives could rely on substantial 
experience in reconciliation work, for example in Israel, Poland, or Norway. 
Here one can observe a far-reaching impact of the 1960s’ and 1970s’ culture 
of remembrance on the actors. The emotionalized, subjective discussion of the 
German past was amplified by the increasing media exposure of the issue.63 
Attention to the sufferings of the Belarusian people brought most notably the 
broadly recognised 1985 movie produced by Mosfilm and Belarusfilm “Idi i 
smotri“ [“Go and look“], which was voted “movie of the month” by the “Jury 
of Protestant film work” in West Germany in 1987. Based on the work of the 
                                                             
57  Lingelbach 2009, 400-409. 
58  Voswinkel 2003. He referred to the mud brick building project of “Heim-statt Tscherno-
byl”. But other associations can also be subsumed under this motto, not least the volunteer 
service “Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste” (Action Reconciliation Service for Peace), 
which has been sending volunteers to Belarus since 1992.  
59  See also Gerlach 2000. 
60  Marples 2001, 150. 
61  Steinacker 2001, 24.  
62  For East German, non-Christian initiatives this aspect obviously did not play such an influ-
ential role. They built their commitment on contacts already established during GDR times, 
as the results of a survey show (archive of the author). 
63  Cf. Biess 2008, 60. 
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Belarusian writer and later Chernobyl activist Ales’ Adamovich, it tells, dra-
matically and through the eyes of the boy Florya, of the atrocities committed by 
the National Socialists in Belarus.  
The reservations of older Belarusians in particular with respect to the Ger-
man donors is an expression of the multidimensional area of conflict “victim of 
National Socialism/winner/victim of the atomic disaster versus offender of 
National Socialism/defeated/helper after the atomic disaster”, whose further 
exploration and historicization through research looks as though it would be 
very rewarding. To look at it through the Cold War prism of friend and foe 
does not explain it entirely; rather it is necessary to break down the complex 
processes of victimization on the one hand and heroization on the other.  
Between Knowledge of the Affected and Expert Knowledge 
The discussion of the disaster’s consequences within the German initiatives, as 
well as their interplay with their Belarusian partners, was from the very begin-
ning influenced by the tension between the subjective, mainly emotionally 
based knowledge of those affected (uncertainty and fear of disease and death), 
and the claimed factual objectivity of expert knowledge.64 Even if, far into the 
1970s, the development of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic was pre-
sented as a non-political issue, as determined by factual rationality and exper-
tise alone, it was extremely difficult to distinguish those who were experts and 
those who were not.65 Even if confidence in experts had decreased during the 
course of the development of the “New Social movements” in West Germany, 
in tandem with additional uncertainty, the “experts’” opinions gained in power 
immensely following Chernobyl. The demand for reliable, reassuring numbers 
in a time full of uncertainty and the increasing importance of human security 
seemed to be boundless. Statistics on disease, contamination, and deaths 
played, and still play, an important role in the arguments of both the helping 
and receiving initiatives. It is particularly remarkable with regard to disease 
and, especially in this case, cancer statistics. The search for criteria to classify 
the non-classifiable and simultaneously to legitimize the honorary involvement 
contributed to the amalgamation of highly complex factual arguments with 
value convictions.66 Experts, above all physicians and physicists, were granted 
considerable confidence in advance.67 Statistics became a resource in the com-
petition for support in Germany, as well as for German assistance in Belarus. 
Sometimes it seemed that scientific arguments were of superficial importance 
                                                             
64  For expert culture see, for example, Kurz-Milcke and Gigerenzer 2004; Fisch and Rudloff 
2004. 
65  Radkau 1983, 14, 85. 
66  Cf. Weisker 2004, 416. 
67  Cf. Weisker 2005, 203; Weisker 2004. 
 302
only and could become independent when scientific and humanitarian aspects 
were intermingled. The initiatives used the statistics in an appellative and mo-
bilizing way to gain aid money, supporters or new activists, and to reassure 
themselves of the legitimacy of being involved. Cases of overstatement, inap-
propriate comparisons or the passing on of stereotypes also occurred.68 
At the same time, the initiatives generated a new group of experts for them-
selves: the activists and those involved. According to them, they became the 
real Chernobyl experts, with their own eyes and ears.69 
Discourses on health and increasing concern about physical and mental 
well-being played an important role in civil society mobilization in the envi-
ronmental movement in the 1970s. A paradigmatic change in the area of con-
flict between environment and health took place. The definition of health be-
came much more socio-ecologically induced and linked closely to normative 
concepts of security, well-being, quality of life, environmental awareness and 
sustainability. Cancer took the central place in these discourses. A discussion 
of the “disease of civilisation” occurred in literature, popular science, and sci-
ence, and was often accompanied by an autobiographical component and an 
understanding of the environment as pathogenic. This development fostered a 
sensitization to invisible carcinogenic substances in the environment and in 
food. The subjective discussion concerning disease had a strong socio-critical 
component; it granted political criticism a new form of “existential exigency 
and emotionality”.70 
The “Chernobyl Children” 
“When the children come to Germany, they bring along their own message. 
Their bodies and souls are the witnesses of the largest industrial disaster of 
history and the beginning of nuclear genocide, an unmistakable warning for all 
of us. Their message reads baldly and simply: I want to live.”71 With these 
metaphorical and empathic words the former first chairperson of the federal 
association “For the children of Chernobyl”, the former Protestant priest 
Burkhard Homeyer, described the foundation of the commitment of the largest 
German Chernobyl network. By far the largest part of the German Chernobyl 
initiatives, numerically speaking, has dedicated itself to the “Chernobyl chil-
                                                             
68  Thus, one initiative answered on the question of what they are aiming for with their com-
mitment: “To show the children that there is another life – without vodka, with regular 
work and so on.” Archive of the author.  
69  Homeyer 2006. 
70  Biess 2008, 63. Compare also his notions about the paradoxical consequences of the in-
creasing medical check-ups, which eventually tend to cause more fear than they reduce. 
Biess 2008, 68. 
71  Homeyer 1995, 2-3. 
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dren”, as is also expressed in the names of the organisations involved. As in 
Belarus, a multitude of initiatives in Germany have chosen almost identical 
names. Even today, the organisation of the disputed recuperation holidays is 
the most common form of involvement.72 
The amount given as charitable donations in the Federal Republic is, accord-
ing to Lingelbach, generally at its largest when it is aimed at the helping of 
children. This is also true in the case of Chernobyl, if “donation” includes the 
involvement of volunteers. Children are seen as especially “worthy”, innocent, 
and vulnerable. They call up instincts of help and patronage. At the same time, 
they also produce a feeling of power and feasibility for those involved, which 
tends to be much more limited in the case of adults who are in need.73 In the 
external communication concerning the Chernobyl children, there are, on the 
one hand, optimistic, pro-life metaphors such as “bridge to peace”, while on the 
other hand there is also nihilistic, stigmatising rhetoric such as “children with-
out future”, “the moribund” or “generation Chernobyl”. 
With regard to visual depiction, at times the boundaries of the “pornography 
of misery”74 were overstepped by exhibiting handicapped, deformed children, 
who were even naked in some cases, without any need of doing so.75 Even if 
there is a medical-educational motivation behind it, it does not explain why 
such pictures are used in non-medical works. The use of such pictures obvi-
ously serves to win attention, which, for the initiatives, is connected with the 
hope of inducing others to help. 
The classical principle of childcare as an investment for the future is in some 
initiatives also connected with political ambitions. With regard to the authori-
tarian regime in Belarus, hopes for democratization are particularly resonant 
for those involved. Many initiatives hope that the experience the children have 
gained with their West German host families will contribute to a democratiza-
tion of the political situation in Belarus. To what extent former “Chernobyl 
children” have indeed internalized Western democratic values, whether they 
really are connected with their stay in Germany, whether those values have 
matured into action, and whether “Chernobyl youth” does indeed stand for a 
                                                             
72  The dispute about the usefulness and appropriateness of taking child-recuperation abroad 
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democratic public as some initiatives explicitly aspire to in their aims, still 
needs to be investigated. 
Summary 
There can be no understanding of the German Chernobyl commitment without 
taking into account the development of the New Social Movements in the 
1970s and 1980s, particularly the anti-NPP movement and the “new” peace 
movement. The “new culture of expressive emotionality”76, which was closely 
intertwined with an increasing sense of ecological insecurity, had a decisive 
influence on the forms of action, self-interpretation, and the communication 
styles of the associations. East and West were thereby united in some respects: 
The commitment to the mitigation of the disaster’s consequences was not 
solely based on the perception of the direct consequences, which were in any 
case not entirely comprehensible, but were also based on a general feeling of 
insecurity, uncertainty and an increasing sensitization during the “environ-
mental age”. As has been shown, the expression of fear – in particular fear of 
disease and loss of well-being − played a central role. Fear became capable of 
being verbalized and displayed, contrasting and intermingling with expert 
knowledge, and thus developing its potential for mobilization. The underlying 
shared assumption of the necessity of human security, taking individual anxie-
ties and concerns seriously, thus enabled action and social practices beyond the 
framework of conventional understandings of security. Human security, with 
its proclaimed focus on the actions of non-state actors and the protection and 
empowerment of individuals77, impedes efforts to establish clear cut divisions 
between the different dimensions of security and actually tends to offer an 
opportunity to include all of them. Thus its meaning becomes even vaguer. 
This, however, might still be a fitting reflection of the complex processes tak-
ing place in the “environmental age”. 
At the same time, the change in the emotional regime also affected the re-
membrance culture, which gave a crucial, albeit indirect, stimulus to the com-
mitment. The majority of the associations define themselves not only as initia-
tors of reconciliation, but also – and often in the same breath – as reminders of 
the atomic disaster. They were successful in taking the threats of the use of 
nuclear energy far into the provinces. Furthermore, the transnational conse-
quences of the disasters and the commitment automatically heightened aware-
ness of Europe as a geographical space where ecological hazards do not stop, 
even when they run up against an iron curtain. Ecological security is not a 
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matter of nation states and cannot be dealt with using conventional concepts of 
security. 
The various forms of civil society commitment and the formation of transna-
tional alliances at the level of civil society, partly even with state financial 
support, can be read as a new form of security and foreign affairs within a 
global civil society. In this global civil society the perspective of the mass 
media is dominant and the active commitment of non-governmental organisa-
tions weakens the competences of the state. The focus of this global civil soci-
ety is human security, concentrating attention on the (security) needs of indi-
viduals instead of states, and closely linked to discourses on civil and human 
rights as well as international development. The social networks which were 
manifested following Chernobyl not only led to transnational interpersonal 
contacts, but also developed skills on all sides for coping with situations of 
uncertainty and thus strove for something which might be called human secu-
rity. 
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